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ABSTRACT
This study assessed the Government of Puerto Rico’s crisis and emergency risk com-
munications following Hurricane Maria and the post-disaster information environ-
ment to identify factors that may have contributed to negative public perceptions of 
mortality reports. Data included Government of Puerto Rico press releases, press con-
ference audio recordings and Facebook Live transmissions, digital media news and 
social media commentary, and interviews with Government of Puerto Rico personnel 
and community stakeholders. Study findings indicate that inadequate crisis commu-
nication planning and training, coupled with information gaps and inconsistencies, 
contributed to rumors around the issue of mortality. As a consequence, the Govern-
ment of Puerto Rico lost the ability to effectively manage messaging, thus decreasing 
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their credibility, perceived transparency, and public trust. Recommendations regarding 
future preparedness activities and research are offered. 
KEYWORDS: crisis communication, disasters, mortality, rumor generation
Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico on September 
20, 2017, as a Category 4 storm, causing widespread devastation 
and becoming the costliest tropical cyclone in Puerto Rican his-
tory (Scott, 2018). Numerous challenges to disaster response and 
recovery were exacerbated by multiple cascading failures in crit-
ical infrastructure and key resource sectors. Maria left millions 
of residents without electricity for weeks to months, and entire 
communities were isolated due to disrupted telecommunications, 
blocked roadways, and flooding (Federal Emergency Management 
Administration [FEMA], 2018). In this context, Government of 
Puerto Rico officials experienced difficulty providing timely and 
accurate information about hurricane-related deaths. Soon after 
the hurricane, the official death toll was widely questioned given 
the storm’s severity, anecdotal evidence, and studies by outside 
groups estimating mortality of up to 72 times the official count of 
64 deaths (Acosta & Irizarry, 2018; Kishore et al., 2018; Pascual 
Sosa, 2017; Rivera & Rolke, 2019; Robles et al., 2017; Santos-
Lozada & Howard, 2018). As evidence for a higher death toll 
mounted, so did the public’s request for this issue to be addressed.
The George Washington University Milken Institute School of 
Public Health (GW SPH) was commissioned by the Government 
of Puerto Rico to conduct an independent study that included: 
(1) an epidemiological assessment of excess mortality; (2) a pro-
cess evaluation of disaster context death certification; and (3) an 
assessment of the Government of Puerto Rico’s crisis and emer-
gency risk communication (CERC), with an emphasis on mortal-
ity reporting to the public. Here, we discuss the third component, 
with an overarching goal of identifying factors that may have con-
tributed to controversy surrounding the death toll. To this end, we 
assessed the application of CERC guidelines by the Puerto Rican 
Government, in particular for public communication about mor-
tality; examined the information environment in which mortality 
was conveyed; and explored Puerto Rican stakeholder perceptions 
regarding these communications. 
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Literature Review
Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication
Communication with the public is a critical component of effective 
disaster preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery (Centers 
for Disease Control [CDC], 2014; World Health Organization 
[WHO], 2005). Effective communication in disasters requires 
extensive planning and active management, and includes elements 
to establish public trust through information source credibility 
and transparency (Covello, 2003; Reynolds, 2006, 2011; Seeger, 
2006; Steelman & McCaffrey, 2013; S. Veil et al., 2008). Effective 
Media Communication during Public Health Emergencies lays out 
six recommended steps for effective media communication, and 
includes capacity assessment tools, such as the Internal Media 
Relations Assessment Tool and an Effective Media Communication 
Plan checklist (WHO, 2005). Further, there are guidelines in 
the Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) manual 
(CDC, 2014), which outline principles of risk communication in 
crisis, and details other considerations, such as planning and the 
communication lifecycle; crisis stages; audiences, messages, and 
channels; spokespersons; human resources; and working with the 
media. However, the experiences of Hurricane Maria underscored 
the limitations of these guidelines when communicating about 
mortality after a catastrophic natural disaster. 
Information Vacuums and Public Perception in Disasters
Regardless of established best practices and guidelines for com-
munication, disasters present unique challenges given their inher-
ent uncertainty, particularly in the case of catastrophic natural 
disasters (Seeger et al., 2018; Tinker & Vaughan, 2010). In rapidly 
evolving disaster contexts, facts can be elusive. Communicators 
must have the capacity to adapt, especially when faced with lim-
ited availability of credible information, or an unmet “informa-
tion sufficiency threshold” (Griffin et al., 2009; Seeger et al., 2018, 
p. 197). In disasters, these information vacuums create opportu-
nities for the public to speculate, make inferences to explain gaps, 
question motives, generate rumors, or propagate unverified/false 
information, in an attempt to reconcile perceived incongruences 
(Hagar, 2013). 
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In the absence of sufficient information, people tend to rely 
on their perceptions (Reynolds, 2011; Seeger, 2006; Seeger 
et al., 2018), as well as information sources they already trust and 
familiar channels (Savoia et al., 2013; Wray et al., 2008). Given the 
importance of public perception in disasters and the potential risks 
introduced by information vacuums, CERC planning and delivery 
should incorporate mitigation of any gaps between public percep-
tions and facts (Peters et al., 1997; Pornpitakpan, 2004; Ruggiero & 
Vos, 2015). Nevertheless, while CERC guidelines address the cor-
rection of misinformation and misperceptions in the media, they 
do not adequately address how information vacuums, a phenome-
non that is likely to occur following catastrophic events, should be 
handled by communicators after disasters. 
Navigating the Disaster Information Environment 
Inevitably, disaster communication exists within a larger disaster 
information environment, compelling communicators to monitor 
and interact with this environment (Savoia et al., 2017). An increas-
ing number of studies highlight the impact that news media can 
have on public perceptions and behaviors in crises (Eckert et al., 
2018; Parmer et al., 2016; Westerman et. al., 2014), demonstrating 
its potential to be leveraged for its broad public reach and familiar-
ity (Littlefield & Quenette, 2007; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). Social 
media networks have, in many cases, eclipsed traditional mass 
media as critical disaster information sources. As a rapid, two-way 
channel, social media has the potential to create disaster response 
transparency, enhance situational awareness, facilitate aid deliv-
ery, and crowd-verify or eliminate rumors (Hughes & Palen, 2012; 
Yates & Paquette, 2011). At the same time, not all disaster response 
agencies have established capacities to monitor public reactions 
and engage with stakeholders in real time through social media 
platforms. Consequently, these information-sharing networks can 
produce unprecedented challenges, such as the rapid propagation 
of misinformation, contributing to an information environment 
that can swiftly spin out of control (Liu et al., 2014). In these cases, 
organizations leading disaster response risk losing their ability 
to manage crisis messaging, potentially compromising response 
efforts (Reynolds, 2011; Seeger, 2006). 
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Communication of Disaster Mortality to the Public 
A key issue of public interest following disasters is mortality, espe-
cially since it is crucial to informing response and recovery efforts, 
policymaking, providing insight into population health status, and 
creating a broader understanding of the disaster’s magnitude and 
impact (Checchi & Roberts, 2005; Rickard et al., 2013; Salama 
et al., 2004; Santos-Burgoa et al., 2018). Notably, mortality also 
has the potential to become highly politicized following disasters 
(Checchi & Roberts, 2008). Despite the importance of communi-
cating to the public about disaster mortality, there is a scarcity of 
research in this area, and currently no consensus, on best practices 
for disaster mortality communication—it is here where the expe-
riences of Hurricane Maria offer important lessons. 
While disaster psychology and risk communication are estab-
lished fields, efforts in the scientific and emergency management 
communities to systematically examine how the public processes 
and interprets disaster death counts or estimates are minimal. It is 
reasonable to think that lay audiences and media outlets may expe-
rience difficulty understanding methods used to determine disas-
ter mortality (Lagassé et al., 2011; Reynolds, 2011; Seeger et al., 
2003), which can be statistically complex and vary from one study 
to another. Nevertheless, these methods influence how mortality 
estimates can be interpreted given the assumptions and limitations 
of each approach (Hammer, 2018; Sandberg et al., 2019). This very 
scenario unfolded following Hurricane Maria, when the informa-
tion environment became saturated with media coverage compar-
ing the official death toll to numerous unofficial estimates, all using 
distinct methods, time periods, and populations at risk to produce 
mortality estimates (Sandberg et al., 2019). Yet, these death figures 
were compared without considering these important differences.
Following Hurricane Maria, journalists and the general public 
demanded that every lost life be counted, viewing this method as 
the most valid method of truly knowing how many died (Chec-
chi & Roberts, 2008). While it is appropriate to mourn every lost 
life following such a tragedy, this information can be difficult to 
obtain and verify in the immediate post-disaster period. This 
expectation of having timely and accurate hurricane-related death 
counts immediately following a catastrophic disaster represents a 
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failure among scientists and communicators to convey the inher-
ent superiority of excess mortality estimation over “body counts” 
in complex disaster scenarios where surveillance systems and 
death certification processes are disrupted (Checchi & Roberts, 
2008). Currently, there is little to guide communicators in making 
this distinction apparent to public audiences; while there is scien-
tific literature related to mortality surveillance (Choudhary, 2012; 
Farag et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2017; Rocha et al., 2017; Seil et al., 
2016) and documenting cause of death (Centre for Research on 
the Epidemiology of Disasters [CRED], 2016; Lakkireddy et al., 
2004; Phillips et al., 2014; Wexelman et al., 2013), there is a paucity 
of studies exploring the specific concept of communicating disas-
ter mortality to the public. There is no literature base that exam-
ines how death counts from a disaster should be communicated to 
the media, how to best explain information gaps that are common 
following disasters, how death counts may evolve post-disaster, or 
how to explain the science behind excess death estimates and what 
we can or cannot infer from these estimates. This research gap 
increases the likelihood that efforts in this area of communication 
will continue to be fraught with challenges if not addressed.
Methods
To understand factors that may have contributed to the death 
toll controversy, we used a multisource post-disaster CERC rapid 
assessment protocol to examine Government of Puerto Rico com-
munications and spokesperson media interactions, how these 
interactions influenced the evolution of media coverage, and 
stakeholder perceptions of mortality reports. CERC and WHO 
guidelines informed the analytical framework described below 
(CDC, 2014; WHO, 2005). 
Data Collection and Analysis
We collected data from five sources. We systematically reviewed 
17 Government of Puerto Rico press releases and 20 press confer-
ences (10 Facebook Live transmissions, 10 audio recordings) for 
the study period, September 20, 2017–February 28, 2018, to iden-
tify key messages and spokesperson delivery of mortality informa-
tion (see Table 1). 
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TABLE 1 Press Releases and Press Conferences
Data 
Source
Analytical Framework Source 
Assessment Criteria
Pr
es
s 
Re
le
as
es
  
(n
=2
0)
WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health  
Emergencies handbook: 
https://www.who.int/csr/resources/ 
publications/WHO_CDS_2005_31/en/
Press Release Content Included:
(1) Key messages to the public; (2) Actions currently being taken; 
(3) Actions that will be taken next; (4) How the public can help;  
(5) Where to look for more information
CDC CERC manual guidelines: https://emergency.cdc.gov/cerc/
manual/index.asp adapted criteria, 9 Elements for Establishing  
Trust and Credibility through Communications, p. 158; adapted  
criteria, Spokesperson Pitfalls During an Emergency, p. 160  
WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health  
Emergencies handbook, Steps of Communication in Crisis
 P
re
ss
 C
on
fe
re
nc
es
 
 (n
=1
7)
Content and Spokesperson Delivery included:
1. Expression of empathy (trust)
[Demonstrates empathy, caring, commitment—verbally and 
in body language] 
•  When responding to a question or comment about loss of 
any kind (death/injury) first expressed compassion, empathy, 
caring? 
• Acknowledged the validity of people’s emotions?
2. Clarifying facts/call for action (credibility)
  [What you know—in clear, key messages; Information is 
accessible to all educational levels; Avoid professional jargon; 
Information source expertise (education, role); Accuracy: 
Accurate facts that have been confirmed; Consistency:  
Consistent information] 
•  Delivered information in a clear manner? 
•  Used language appropriate for target audiences? 
•  Avoided the use of undefined jargon, acronyms and technical 
language? 
•  Provided supporting facts for key messages? 
•  Used numbers, statistics and data effectively? 
•  Acted in partnership with credible third parties? 
•  Avoided going beyond the bounds of expertise? 
•  Made corrections quickly if errors were made? 
•  Provided consistent, coordinated information?
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Pr
es
s 
Co
nf
er
en
ce
s
(n
=1
7)
3. What is not known (trust/transparency)
  [Acknowledgement of Uncertainty: What you don’t know—in 
clear key messages; Explain why information isn’t available 
for release] 
 •  Acknowledged uncertainty? 
 •  Discussed data and information uncertainties, strengths and 
weaknesses—including those identified by other credible 
sources? 
 •  Clarified unknown information in a way that established trans-
parency (“I don’t know” instead of “I cannot answer that”)? 
 •  Avoided guessing/speculating? 
 •  Provided a valid reason for not answering the question?
4. Process to obtain answers (trust/transparency)
  [What process you are using to get answers: explain steps/
required information] 
  •  Described the process required to obtain requested  
information? 
  •  Explained what processes you are waiting for, circumstances 
contributing to delays?
  •  Supported and reinforced your message with visual aids such 
as timelines or flowcharts?
5. Statements of commitment (accountability) 
  •  Stated commitment to acquiring and providing additional 
information as soon as possible?
6. Information referrals/scheduled updates (transparency) 
  •  Provided guidance on where to obtain additional information 
that expanded on key messages?
We conducted qualitative content analysis of press releases 
based on the extent to which they included information on hur-
ricane mortality in five areas (Maxwell, 2009) (see Table 1): inclu-
sion of mortality as a key message (and consistency of provided 
details); what was being done to assess mortality; what will be 
done to assess mortality; actions the public could take to assist; 
and where to look for more information. We also reviewed press 
conference proceedings based on criteria drawn from WHO and 
CDC guidelines (see Table 1). We assessed spokesperson delivery 
and content to determine the extent to which these criteria were 
met, thus contributing to the conceptual domains of trust, credi-
bility, transparency, and accountability. For example, if spokesper-
sons fail to describe steps being taken to determine mortality and 
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provide vague responses about information they have about the 
death count, this may compromise perceptions of trust and trans-
parency among public audiences.
To assess potential information environment influence on 
stakeholder perceptions of Government of Puerto Rico mortality 
reports, we systematically collected and reviewed 172 English- and 
Spanish-language digital media news reports and related social 
media commentary. We collected primary sources of information 
or stories from major U.S. mainland and Puerto Rican news out-
lets (e.g., CNN, Washington Post, New York Times, El Nuevo Día, 
LatinoUSA, among others). News articles (n=53) and social media 
posts were identified through web-based search engines (Google, 
Yahoo) and social media platforms (YouTube, n=36; Facebook, 
n=37; and Twitter, n=46) by systematically searching for predeter-
mined keywords and hashtags (see Table 2). 
TABLE 2 Digital Media News Reports & Social Media Commentary
Data 
Source
Analytical Framework Source
Assessment Criteria
D
ig
it
al
 M
ed
ia
 N
ew
s 
Re
po
rt
s 
&
 S
oc
ia
l  
M
ed
ia
 C
om
m
en
ta
ry
 (n
=1
72
)
CDC CERC manual guidelines, Working with Social Media Before 
& During a Crisis, p. 268
WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health Emer-
gencies handbook
(1) Reasons and timing of mortality reports; (2) Appropriate 
use of statistics; (3) Contradictory mortality data from official 
spokespeople and unofficial sources; (4) Information used to 
classify death as hurricane-related; (5) Explanations and illustra-
tions given for complex topics/processes; (6) Information gaps 
filled by unofficial information; (7) Perceptions of the accuracy 
and transparency of Government of Puerto Rico messages 
regarding death figures
Keywords/Phrases: Death toll Hurricane Maria; Deaths Hurricane 
Maria Puerto Rico; Rosello death toll; Controversy death toll 
Hurricane Maria; Deaths Hurricane Maria Puerto Rico; Muertos 
Huracan Maria; Muertes Maria Puerto Rico
Hashtags: #PuertoRico #HurricaneMaria #puertoricohurricane 
Maria #PuertoRicoRelief #PuertoRicoDeathToll #Hurricane 
MariaDeathToll #HurricaneMariaDeaths 
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Digital media data collection captured mortality information des-
tined for the public as it was introduced or changed to understand 
the chronology and information sharing dynamics. We conducted 
qualitative content analysis of digital media news and social media 
commentary to identify content in seven areas, related to domains 
of trust, credibility, transparency, and accountability (Maxwell, 
2009) (see Table 2). For example, if in response to a news article 
suggesting that the official death toll was an undercount, the pre-
dominant commentary expressed the perception that the Puerto 
Rican Government was hiding information that would discredit 
their disaster response, we assessed that line of commentary to 
express perceptions of (non-) transparency and a lack of account-
ability. 
Interviews were also conducted with 33 key informants, includ-
ing 11 Puerto Rican Government personnel and 22 leaders rep-
resenting stakeholder groups, during a 2-week period in April of 
2018. Interviews helped characterize actions and events related to 
preparation and dissemination of mortality data, as well as stake-
holder perceptions of the Government’s mortality communi-
cations. Government personnel participants held key positions 
TABLE 3 In-Depth Interviews
Data 
Source
Analytical Framework Source
Assessment Criteria
Co
m
m
un
it
y 
 
St
ak
eh
ol
de
r  
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
(n
=2
2) CDC CERC manual guidelines, Stakeholder and Partner  
Communication, p. 241
WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health Emer-
gencies handbook
Qualitative thematic analysis, Perceptions of mortality reports—
in the domains of trust, transparency, accountability, credibility 
(subdomains: expertise, accuracy, consistency)
G
ov
er
nm
en
t  
Pe
rs
on
ne
l  
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
(n
=1
1) CDC CERC manual guidelines, 9-step crisis communication plan and 
process, p. 98; Working with Social Media Before and During a Crisis, 
p. 268
WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health  
Emergencies handbook
Qualitative thematic analysis, Accounts of mortality reporting 
communication processes
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including heads of agencies or departments and communication 
leadership or staff. Community stakeholder participants included 
municipal mayors, community leaders, emergency responders, 
police, faith leaders, health care providers, non-profit organi-
zation staff, and funeral home directors, which were selected to 
represent all regions of Puerto Rico and exemplify a range of expe-
riences given municipal diversity in socioeconomic status, polit-
ical affiliation, demographics, and proximity to hospitals/clinics. 
We conducted interviews that lasted approximately 1 hour using 
a semi-structured protocol in Spanish. Interviews were audio- 
recorded and transcribed. Participants provided informed consent 
and protocols were IRB-approved. Shown in Table 3, we deductively 
and inductively coded transcripts using a procedure similar to the 
qualitative content analysis described above, and analyzed coded text 
to identify major themes representing participant response patterns. 
Coding was accomplished using NVivo version 11 software. As such, 
common and unique views and experiences among stakeholder and 
government personnel participants were elucidated (Bernard, 2005; 
Maxwell, 2009).
Results
Results are presented below, and organized into the following 
thematic areas: (1) CERC planning and coordination under-
taken by the Government of Puerto Rico; (2) handling of mor-
tality information gaps by the Government of Puerto Rico; (3) 
unofficial mortality reports in the information environment; and 
(4) Government of Puerto Rico CERC capacity, including spokes-
person performance. Perceptions of Puerto Rico stakeholders are 
discussed throughout.
CERC Planning and Coordination
According to Government of Puerto Rico personnel participants, 
a number of factors created difficult circumstances for the teams 
responsible for CERC, mortality surveillance, and communication 
of mortality to the public. These circumstances stemmed from the 
devastation caused by Hurricane Maria, and also because a foun-
dation for effective disaster communication was not in place. The 
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Government of Puerto Rico did not have formal, written CERC 
plans at the time of the hurricane. As noted in our interviews:
. . . there was nothing [for CERC plans]. We were preparing—we 
had a couple of months saying this is what we need, these are the 
work groups. We had everything set up, and then boom [the hurri-
cane hit].—Government of Puerto Rico Agency Leadership
Was there a written emergency communication plan before the  
hurricane? Not that I was aware of.—Government of Puerto Rico 
Agency Communication Leadership
According to agency leadership, Puerto Rico’s emergency plan, 
and municipal emergency plans, was appropriate for a Category 1 
hurricane, but not a catastrophic event. According to one member 
of the Government of Puerto Rico Agency Leadership:
. . . the plans in Puerto Rico were not prepared for a Category 5 
hurricane. The plans in Puerto Rico are prepared for a Category 1 
hurricane, which is really what we are used to having in Puerto Rico. 
So, now they have learned that the plan created many difficulties 
because neither the people were prepared for this [hurricane], nor 
the agencies either. 
As a result, emergency plans did not include scenarios such 
as multiple cascading failures in critical infrastructure and key 
resource sectors, as specified in the Department of Homeland 
Security’s National Planning Scenario (NPS) #10, “Category 3 or 
Higher Hurricane.” Mass media channels were largely unavailable, 
and Government personnel had not strategically planned to use 
alternative channels, such as radio or interpersonal communica-
tion, to coordinate public health or disaster response efforts. As 
various participants in our interviews noted:
We were almost completely incomunicado. There was only one  
radio station.—Community Leader
There was one [radio] station that worked during the hurricane . . .  
it was the only media that there was, no cellular, no television, no 
electricity, and in terms of health information, on that station it was 
very general.—Non-profit Organization Personnel
. . . let’s talk about leptospirosis. Well, I presented this issue direct-
ly to the Department of Health. There was no response to prevent  
cases. That never occurred. —Municipal Mayor
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Finally, communication contingencies that were implemented 
were inconsistent or ineffective. As one Municipal Mayor noted: 
Communications? Bad . . . satellite phones didn’t work at all. I even 
remember when the personnel came to our municipality to demon-
strate how the satellite phone worked, and they said to me, “Mayor, 
there’s no way. What you will have to do is use it after midnight.” 
And I said, “What do I need it for after midnight?” I think that for 
almost all of the mayors the satellite phone didn’t work.
The lack of communication capabilities post-hurricane 
detracted from community members’ perceived credibility of 
preparedness and response efforts. According to one community 
leader:
For me it was surprising to see people from emergency manage-
ment that didn’t have radio communication. I could not believe 
that in the middle of a hurricane, the most important people in  
Puerto Rico for managing disasters weren’t prepared. So, the worst 
part of everything was the question of preparedness . . . really, for us 
it showed complete ineptitude in this day and age . . .
These factors related to planning and infrastructure collapse 
limited the Puerto Rican Government’s ability to coordinate with 
municipalities and provide timely, reliable mortality information 
to the public. On one hand, Government personnel who were 
operating from the Center for Operations in Emergencies (COE) 
described a highly centralized process for preparing information 
destined for the public. This was reflected, for example, in the con-
sistency between death counts given by spokespersons and press 
releases. However, communication personnel also noted chal-
lenges and delays in coordinating mortality data with municipali-
ties, again related to infrastructure collapse and inadequate plans 
for effective contingencies. According to a member of the Govern-
ment of Puerto Rico Agency Communication Leadership:
The problem with communication between municipalities and the 
central government was that there was no way to communicate effi-
ciently. At first, the governor had [someone] going to all the munici-
palities each day to communicate. A lot of information was delayed. 
We were at the COE 24 hours and communication among us was 
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continual. But, information wasn’t flowing from municipalities. 
There should have been a designated liaison at each municipality 
to communicate with the central government instead of one person 
trying to reach all 78 municipalities. 
Further complicating the communication of hurricane-related 
mortality to the public was the establishment of the Department 
of Public Safety (DPS) only months prior to hurricane season. This 
was the new umbrella for seven agencies related to emergency 
management, public safety, and forensic sciences. There are two 
agencies responsible for handling mortality data in Puerto Rico: 
(1) the Demographic Registry under the Department of Health 
(DOH), which is the final destination for all death records, and 
(2) the Bureau of Forensic Sciences, which is responsible for inves-
tigating any deaths suspected to be from unnatural causes, and had 
been recently shifted under the DPS umbrella. According to study 
participants, at the time of the hurricane, the transition to fully 
integrate this newly formed agency umbrella had not yet occurred, 
and this contributed to confusion about the delegation of respon-
sibilities and processes underlying disaster mortality reporting. At 
the time of the hurricane, there was no updated, written protocol 
in place to coordinate release of information to the public between 
the two agencies. Upon creation of the DPS, decision-making 
changed for the timing and clearance of mortality data for the 
public, and one respondent perceived that the formal vetting pro-
cess had been compromised.
Emergency plans for events with mass mortality always have a uni-
fied command, where there should be periodic meetings between 
the Department of Health, Bureau of Forensic Sciences, Depart-
ment of Justice, Demographic Registry. Once the event happens, 
these meetings take place to make the decision about what infor-
mation was going to be shared with the public. When the Depart-
ment of Public Safety was created, an office which still hadn’t been 
well-formed, the hurricane came. There was confusion because it 
wasn’t Health that disseminated information on mass mortality, but 
instead DPS . . . I think that information . . . it didn’t pass formally 
through the Executive Committee because the process was disrupt-
ed, and there’s another person requesting information, even though 
it wasn’t through the official source.—Puerto Rico Government 
Agency Leadership
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Stakeholder respondents perceived this lack of coordination 
and protocol in mortality reporting as a DOH failure because 
shifts in agency responsibilities between the DPS and DOH were 
still not well-understood by community stakeholders. As noted by 
some of our participants:
It seems to me there wasn’t a coordination protocol [for mortality 
surveillance] with the Department of Health.—Municipal Emer-
gency Management Director
I went back to the Convention Center and intercepted the Secretary 
of Health, and I say to him, “Secretary, we have a situation with 
death certificates.” I don’t believe the Department of Health was as 
proactive as I expected . . . what he said was: “Go to the Center of 
Operations and raise the issue.” We went there and we raised the 
issue, went back two days later to search for a solution, but there still 
wasn’t a solution.—Municipal Mayor
Handling of Information Gaps
Due to the devastation caused by Hurricane Maria and signifi-
cant challenges to mortality surveillance, Government officials 
did not always have sufficient information to provide the public. 
Additionally, measures were not taken to explain these gaps or to 
monitor and counteract the spread of misinformation. The hurri-
cane-related death count was typically not a key message in press 
conferences, and the Governor did not talk about the death toll 
unless asked specifically, after which he confirmed the official count 
in concordance with press releases or deferred to the Secretary of 
Public Safety. According to a review of press releases, beginning 
with the first official figure of six deaths on September 22, authori-
ties clarified that more deaths were likely, but only those confirmed 
as hurricane-related would be reported, vaguely citing “safety per-
sonnel” as responsible for making this determination.
Based on a review of press materials, media coverage, and 
participant interviews, there was no overview given to the public 
to outline mortality surveillance or death certification processes. 
Spokespersons did not provide details or illustrations to facilitate 
an understanding of how these processes had been interrupted, 
and clarify reasons for delays or information gaps. As a member 
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of the Government of Puerto Rico Agency Communication Lead-
ership noted: 
The public doesn’t understand the process for certifying deaths. 
There should be a public awareness and education effort, and media 
should help convey this.
Government communications provided minimal information 
about the next steps they would take to ascertain hurricane-re-
lated deaths, and only two press releases on November 17 and 20 
informed the public about what they could do to help.
Inconsistencies occurred in the provision of details for deaths 
and unexplained increases in deaths. In press releases on Sep-
tember 24 and 25, October 11, 12, 14, 20, and November 1, 2017, 
the Government provided specifics about causes and locations of 
deaths. However, press releases from October 5, 10, and 29 did 
not follow this format, and little to no detail was provided. After 
almost a week post-hurricane, in which the death toll remained 
unchanged at 16, the controversy over mortality count transpar-
ency intensified when, after the U.S. President visited on Octo-
ber 3, the Governor of Puerto Rico announced that the death toll 
had risen from 16 to 34. This coincided with President Trump’s 
comments about the hurricane’s limited impact, and also the 
abrupt change in the level of detail provided about deaths in press 
releases. Very little explanation was given to fill information gaps 
regarding this abrupt increase. When asked about the doubling 
death count on October 4, the Governor answered that the infor-
mation they had before was insufficient, and that they are making 
sure to only count deaths certified as hurricane-related. There was 
no description of how mortality surveillance functions had been 
compromised, and as they began to be restored, that the public 
should anticipate a spike in mortality, a phenomenon known as the 
“Burkle Effect” (Burkle & Greenough, 2008). It was not explained 
that this is an expected occurrence following complex and cata-
strophic disasters. The unexplained abrupt increase in deaths con-
tributed to perceptions that the Government was manipulating 
death counts to avoid discrediting their disaster response, or evade 
blame. In one community leader’s perception:
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The government made an error in not giving the correct number 
of deaths. I think they felt threatened that people would know that  
because of their negligence so many people died . . . one of the things 
that you could tell from the media, when we finally had access, was 
the criticism was strong.
According to stakeholder respondents, this affected percep-
tions of transparency and credibility. According to two partici-
pants: 
In giving that [death] report they weren’t transparent, they weren’t 
sincere with the public. Many of us understand that there’s no rea-
son to hide it. They probably wanted to clean their image . . . I can’t 
give a reason as to why they did it because I don’t understand, but 
they weren’t transparent.—Health Center Personnel
That is what made the public so uncomfortable—they are not tell-
ing the truth, lying. I saw this and was saying, but my God, what’s 
happening? What do they want to hide?—Former Department of 
Health Personnel
The lack of clarity about the death certification process also 
persisted in media coverage, signaling a major impediment to an 
accurate count. Doctors and funeral home directors responding to 
media indicated that they did not have clear guidelines for death 
certification in disasters. Funeral directors noted that they had 
been authorized to proceed with cremations and burials if a death 
had been certified as unrelated to the hurricane. From September 
20 to October 18, there was a seemingly higher than usual autho-
rization of cremations. According to DPS personnel, these crema-
tions were misunderstood to represent hurricane-related deaths:
. . . the body would stay in the hospital if they died there. If they 
died at home and there was no electricity, they had to bury them. In 
order to bury someone, you had to request a permit and the Bureau 
of Forensic Sciences has to provide it. So, people opted to cremate 
because there wasn’t time. That’s why cremations during that time 
period increased. Also, it was cheaper. It had to be done . . . the 
increase in cremations created the perception that all people who 
were cremated died from the hurricane, but one thing has nothing 
to do with the other.
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Explanation of shifting trends in cremations were not provided 
to the public, opening space for misinterpretations, lingering sus-
picions, and questions about death reporting transparency. This 
potentially influenced public perceptions regarding the credibility 
of official death counts.
Unofficial Mortality Reports in the Information Environment 
Numerous attempts were undertaken to employ alternative pro-
cesses for identifying hurricane-related deaths. These investigative 
reports, scientific studies, and media interviews with mayors, health 
care professionals, and first responders, together with reporting of 
available figures from the Demographic Registry, created a confus-
ing post-disaster information environment. Uncertainty regarding 
the official death count was echoed by stakeholder respondents, 
who perceived that the count should have been higher given 
their experiences. As one Municipal Police Commissioner and 
Emergency Management Director noted: 
My town is small. Here we all know each other. Here there were 
weeks when I was saying, “My God, what is happening . . . every 
day someone dies!” I am sure mortality increased . . . I assure you 
that the information being provided wasn’t correct because I know 
my town. I can tell you that . . . it was after the hurricane that it  
increased. It elevated to a very alarming figure.
The perception of an undercount led these stakeholders to con-
clude that government leadership was disconnected from the real-
ities that communities throughout Puerto Rico were experiencing. 
For example, a Municipal Emergency Medical Director stated:
I believe that the impression they gave wasn’t correct because I’ve 
always said that the number given was way below the reality . . . the 
reality that I lived. My colleagues working with me and police that 
were in the street lived it. This reality wasn’t lived by people who 
were tucked away in the Command Center there in San Juan. . . . 
they didn’t live the community’s reality . . . you had to suffer that 
need . . .
Similarly, a Municipal Mayor noted, “I know, I have the num-
bers for my town, I don’t know about the country, but I know that 
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here, deaths almost doubled. I bury them. I open the gates of the 
cemetery.” Some community leaders compared official mortality 
reports to media reports and calls on the radio about missing per-
sons, which they perceived as credible firsthand sources of infor-
mation. For example, in one community leader’s perception:
That they hid information because you see the news and how people 
called the radio program saying that so-and-so is missing. Those 
people that went missing maybe died and were never found. It is 
understood that they died and that information the government 
doesn’t offer as real.
Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication Capacity 
In addition to the Government’s lack of CERC plans, there had 
been insufficient pre-hurricane CERC training of communica-
tion personnel and official spokespersons, further limiting the 
likelihood that CERC best practices would be utilized. This lack 
of CERC training was apparent in spokesperson performance 
and study respondent indication of a lack of formal training for 
communication in disasters. As one government communications 
employee noted:
When they told me to report to the Center for Operations in Emer-
gencies . . . I had no idea what we were going to face. I had to face 
a phenomenon of great proportions, but didn’t know what I was 
going to do there. I’m talking about even at the most basic, personal 
level of what to bring.
Following Hurricane Maria, there were few official spokes-
persons providing information to the public. The Governor ini-
tially conducted daily press conferences as the main spokesperson, 
although he was sometimes accompanied by others. He appeared 
to be prepared with relevant talking points, which aligned with 
press releases. He seemed to listen carefully to questions and 
responded without using overly technical language. To some 
extent, he managed uncertainty by saying what was known, iden-
tifying what was still being reviewed, and indicating willingness to 
provide information when available. However, when asked about 
deaths, he often deferred to the Secretary of Public Safety instead 
of a subject matter expert.
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The Secretary of Public Safety was also a prominent spokes-
person. In his interactions with the media, he delivered concise 
information, conveyed authority, acknowledged uncertainty in the 
mortality count, and also indicated a willingness to provide more 
information when available. However, he provided very limited 
responses to media questions, and in some cases, contradictory 
information. When asked about mortality, his responses tended to 
be relatively limited, such as “We are still reviewing” or “as soon 
as we get more data,” with no specifics provided about what was 
still being reviewed, who was reviewing it, what type of data they 
were waiting for, or why there were delays. Further, while main-
taining on numerous occasions that the government would not 
be influenced by anecdotes or assumptions, he stated in a press 
appearance on November 8 that there could be an increase of 30% 
in the average daily deaths. No details were provided to validate 
this statistic, which conflicted with previous statements, including 
one on October 1, when he speculated that deaths could increase 
“exponentially.” The ineffective use of statistics and suppositions 
may have influenced perceived credibility. 
Both the Governor and the Secretary of Public Safety failed 
to defer to subject matter experts early in the post-disaster period 
to answer questions about mortality surveillance and death cer-
tification. It was not until November 8 that the Secretary of Pub-
lic Safety called upon representatives from the Bureau of Forensic 
Sciences and the Demographic Registry to discuss these processes 
and respond to public inquiry. This coordination with subject 
matter experts occurred too late. By that time, there were already 
inconsistencies and rumors circulating in the information envi-
ronment, as well as growing stakeholder frustration.
The credibility of official messages was also called into ques-
tion with reports of contradictory or unconfirmed statements by 
other public officials. One example was the Mayor of San Juan’s 
response to the Secretary of Homeland Security, stating that the 
death count could be 10 times higher than official data. The Secre-
tary of Public Safety characterized this statement as “irresponsible,” 
but did not offer corrections. In a media interview on September 
28, the Puerto Rican Secretary of Health acknowledged that some 
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hospital morgues were full. According to one funeral home direc-
tor respondent, this contributed to misconceptions since deaths 
occur daily regardless of disasters:
We are more or less the same right now [in April, 2018]—there 
has not been an increase [in deaths]. People have the perception 
that many more people died . . . because in a hospital there are 10 
deaths a day, and funeral homes claim those bodies immediately . . .  
but if funeral homes cannot go . . . tomorrow they have 20 and the 
next day they have 30 . . . there is a perception that there are more  
deceased than there are.
However, the Secretary of Health gave no explanation to con-
textualize morgue capacity. This information vacuum opened an 
opportunity for misconceptions about hurricane-related deaths. 
The Secretary of Health also provided mortality data that had 
not yet been formally incorporated into the official death count. 
For example, in the interview on September 28, he indicated that 
there were seven additional deaths at hospitals, but the cause of 
death was pending; yet the official death toll was 16. The release 
of such unconfirmed, contradictory information may have influ-
enced public perceptions of credibility and transparency.
Limitations
Several limitations should be considered when interpreting study 
findings. Data was collected 7 months post-hurricane, introduc-
ing potential recall bias in respondent accounts. Additionally, 
we undertook a rapid assessment with a condensed study time-
line, limiting the digital media that could be reviewed and the 
interview sample size. We did, however, focus our digital media 
review on pivotal points in the availability of information, and 
interviewed a number of key actors within the Government who 
were involved in mortality data management or communication. 
Furthermore, we recruited interview respondents with diversity 
in a number of criteria that were likely to affect a community’s 
experiences with the hurricane. Regardless of the sample size, we 
reached saturation.
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Discussion
The days and weeks following Hurricane Maria were characterized 
by widespread criticism of the Government of Puerto Rico’s han-
dling of mortality reporting. In addition to the hurricane’s after-
math, there was also a crisis of death toll uncertainty. Not only did 
this issue dominate discourse, detracting from other important 
issues post-hurricane, it also raised key questions about planning 
for similar complex disasters. The experiences of Hurricane Maria 
highlighted areas of prospective research and practice that should 
be prioritized by scientific and disaster communities, and signaled 
areas related to disaster impact communication that should be 
expanded upon in CERC guidelines—mortality communication 
and communicating in catastrophic disaster contexts. 
CERC Guidelines and Information Vacuums 
One goal of communication in disasters is to provide accurate, 
timely information to the public. According to CERC and WHO 
guidelines (CDC, 2014; WHO, 2005), government administra-
tions and disaster response organizations can build public con-
fidence by having coordinated, transparent information sharing, 
and trained spokespersons and subject matter experts to provide 
consistent information and explanations. The Government faced 
difficulties communicating about mortality, stemming from a lack 
of CERC plans and the timing of recent government restructuring 
that complicated coordination. These challenges were exacerbated 
by not anticipating widespread infrastructure failures and a lack of 
communicator CERC training. 
Another goal of communication in disasters is to minimize 
misinformation, which includes monitoring the information envi-
ronment and counteracting rumors (Liu et al., 2014; Savoia et al., 
2017; Seeger, 2006). Following Hurricane Maria, the politicization 
of the death count resulted in part from information gaps coupled 
with insufficient monitoring and rumor control. Major interrup-
tions to mortality surveillance resulted in delayed reporting and 
a substantial information vacuum. Official and unofficial mor-
tality reports proliferated in the media to fill this void, contrib-
uting to stakeholder perceptions that questioned credibility and 
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transparency of the Government of Puerto Rico. In the context 
of waning public trust, overall disaster response capabilities can 
become greatly diminished. 
Additionally, Government of Puerto Rico personnel did not 
recount efforts to engage with stakeholders on social media or sys-
tematically monitor this digital information environment as part 
of an overarching communication strategy. Official press confer-
ences were streamed on the Governor’s Facebook Live account, but 
there were no coordinated efforts taken to monitor and respond to 
misinformation or rumors. Given the potential of social media for 
disseminating verified information and minimizing the spread of 
rumors, this was a missed opportunity. Practitioners engaged in 
disaster preparedness planning should integrate social media use 
into daily operations, dedicating personnel to facilitating stake-
holder relationships, and monitoring and responding to public 
reactions during crisis. 
Situations also arose following the hurricane that were inade-
quately explained by spokespersons. These information gaps cre-
ated opportunities for the public to question the Government’s 
motives and speculate as to why the information was unavail-
able, when it was not necessarily a question of motive. Even in 
the absence of timely mortality data, the processes of mortality 
surveillance and death certification could have been described 
and barriers to these processes detailed. These occurrences follow-
ing Hurricane Maria raise the question about how governments 
and disaster response organizations can adequately prepare to 
communicate in catastrophic disasters, where the likelihood of 
information vacuums is high, mortality surveillance is at risk for 
disruption, and high levels of public interest and media coverage 
can be anticipated. An important consideration is how informa-
tion vacuums should be handled; however, while CERC guidelines 
address the correction of misinformation and misperceptions in 
the media, they do not elaborate on how information vacuums 
should be handled by disaster communicators. Furthermore, 
CERC guidelines delineating communication plan design and 
implementation do not address catastrophic disaster situations, 
when the communication landscape drastically changes and con-
tingencies are required to maintain communication functions. 
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Drawing from lessons learned following Hurricane Maria, current 
CERC guidelines should be expanded to address these important 
areas. With guidelines for communicating following catastrophic 
disasters, planning can be undertaken to anticipate factors such 
as elevated mortality yet disrupted mortality surveillance systems, 
information vacuums accompanied by intense media interest, 
and toppled communication infrastructure necessitating con-
tingencies. With catastrophic CERC guidelines, communicators 
following Hurricane Maria would have been better positioned to 
prepare for substantial information vacuums and address them 
more effectively through messaging and responding to the rapidly 
evolving information environment; have communication plans 
and contingencies in place to enable information sharing and 
message coordination, including with local stakeholders through-
out Puerto Rico; and anticipate mortality as a key point of public 
interest and vital piece of information for disaster responders and 
policymakers. 
Communicating Post-Disaster Mortality 
Risks to credibility, trust, and transparency can be mitigated in 
part by having spokespersons who are highly trained in the subject 
matter, and who place as much importance on the message itself 
as the manner in which the message is communicated. CERC and 
WHO recommendations detail considerations of spokesperson 
selection, characteristics, and training. CERC and WHO guide-
lines also highlight the importance of delivering early messaging 
from information sources that build credibility through illustra-
tive descriptions for complex topics, background information, 
supporting facts, third-party validations, and explanations of sit-
uations that may be questioned by the public. While Government 
of Puerto Rico spokespersons were experienced in public speak-
ing, the lack of CERC media training was notable. This was evi-
denced by spokesperson performance during press conferences 
and media interviews, as well as accounts from study participants 
who indicated that they had not been trained in disaster commu-
nication. Spokesperson missteps, including vague responses when 
asked about disaster mortality, the use of inconsistent statistics, 
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speculation about anticipated mortality counts, late involvement 
of subject matter experts in press conferences, lack of supportive 
materials to explain death certification, communication of deaths 
to the media that had not yet been confirmed as hurricane-re-
lated, and inconsistent messaging between official spokespersons, 
created a post-disaster information environment saturated with 
criticism and diminished credibility of the Government of Puerto 
Rico’s efforts. 
Future disaster preparedness efforts should emphasize spokes-
person and communication personnel training related to mortality 
surveillance processes and communicating with the public about 
mortality, especially following catastrophic events. This raises the 
questions: What is the best way to communicate with the public 
about disaster mortality, and what do we know about how public 
audiences understand and interpret mortality estimates? The cur-
rent CERC and WHO guidelines do not include a nuanced dis-
cussion of communicating disaster mortality to the public. Future 
research should explore these areas in order to inform best prac-
tices. 
Conclusion
The response and recovery period following Hurricane Maria 
was punctuated by significant controversy surrounding mortality 
reporting. Puerto Rican Government officials provided informa-
tion they had available to them at the time and made attempts to be 
open and transparent. Given the level of destruction experienced 
in Puerto Rico, it is likely that delays in mortality surveillance and 
temporary information gaps were inevitable. However, given these 
circumstances, not applying CERC best practices and inadequate 
CERC training led to unexplained information gaps and incon-
sistencies that contributed to rumors and controversy. Confusion 
was intensified by numerous unofficial death counts in the infor-
mation environment. Ultimately, the Government of Puerto Rico 
lost the ability to effectively manage messaging, thus decreasing 
their source credibility, perceived transparency, and public trust. 
While an essential role of government in disasters is to protect the 
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public from risk, the mortality count controversy drained political 
capital and detracted from efforts to meet population health and 
safety needs. 
These experiences highlight the importance of CERC planning 
and training, which should be expanded to include guidelines 
for disasters of catastrophic scale where key resources and infra-
structure are impacted, communication channels are similarly 
degraded, and information vacuums are likely to occur. Future 
research should examine the role of a robust CERC response in 
disaster communications, as well as examine application of the 
CERC model across diverse disasters and contexts, including 
those with considerable resource constraints (Avery, 2019). These 
occurrences also emphasize the need for more impact communi-
cation research, or communicating to the public about a disaster’s 
impact, including mortality. Little is known about how audiences 
process disaster mortality information. Consensus in this area 
will inform development of anticipatory educational materials, 
spokesperson training and key messages, guidelines for inter- 
sectoral and stakeholder collaboration, and recommendations for 
navigating the post-disaster information environment.
Archived links from Table 1
CDC CERC manual guidelines. Retrieved from web archive:
https://web.archive.org/web/20190614141121/https://emergency.
cdc.gov/cerc/manual/index.asp
WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health Emergencies 
handbook. Retrieved from web archive: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190418231742/https://www.who.
int/csr/resources/publications/WHO_CDS_2005_31/en/
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